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TIIE II\{PLICATIONS  ANI) LESSONS TO RE DITA\\'N FROTU
THE IT}](:ENT EXCTIANGU  RA'I'I.] CRI.SIS
- Report by tlrc Coltrrnittee of Governors  -
itt re.spotisc to the itlvilation of the Europcan Courrcil's special nreeting in Birrnilghrnr,
this report suntntitrises the vieu's of thc Conlrnittee of Govenrors on the inrplications of, and tlre
lessons fronl, the recettt cxcharrgc rate crisis, The report is dividcd into four sections, tt*ling fiLstly,
rvith the causcs of the crisi.s; secondly, the assessnrcnt of thc sustainability  of central paritics; rlrirdl;-.
policy respollscs to statrilise extrhange  ratcs; and fourttrly, insritutional  and technicst an:rngcmentr in
the EMS. Thc nrain conclusions  are presented at thc cnd of the report.
I.  TIIE CAUSE.S OF THI' RBCENT EXCIIAT{GE  RATE CRISIS
A tunraround occurred in the sumnrer of 1992 whcn a protonged perio<t withour severe
tensions in the ERM, giving at tinrcs the inrpression of e quasi monctnry union, gave way to a ncw
sittration.  There was a growing  awarenqss thal divergcnccs in national econonric trends had bcen
building up for some limc, as well as a growing awarcncss of different:es in prospects axl policy
requirements, and, as a rgfult, ntarkets cxert€d  nrassivc dcsrabitising prcssures. Therc is bro:rd
consensu.s'in thc-Comntinee thot the crchange markct crisis w:u brought about by a number of
concurent factors:
-  for a numbcr of yca6 prlce cnd cost developmcnts divcrged  aod. in ths facc of stabte
nontlnol exchangc  nates, gavq risc to changos In reol exchangc  rat6 and in intenr.'rtioml
compctlllve positioos within thc Comrnunily;  this nas duo to cxccssivc  wagc claims and
to the Insuflicient concction  of fiscol lnbalanccs in scvcrat Comnunity counhies,
resultlng In an unbalanccd  poticy-mix and an overburdening of monctary policy in its
fight agalnst inflation;
-  tbe ocononric  onvironmcnt  in tbe Communlty became moro comptcx ln Oe ruoke of
.  Gcrman unification. Given Oe challenges of thc procdss, Oe fiscal poticy that was
adoptd dcurand pressures  and the behaviour of wages, a tight mondary stancc was tbe
necessary  resPonsc  for Gcnnany to counter price increascs, lcaving littlc scope for
intcrest rate reduclions. ln those Conrmunity countrlcs wtpre tower rutes of inflation had
bceu achieved, the prolonged weakues.s of econonric activity and deteriorating labour
market conditions  werc fclt to warrant a lorvcring of interest rates. Thc conflict  bctween
domxtlc policy neerls and the nraintcnancc of ERM parities complicated monetary
policy co-ordination  in thc Conrnrunity.  These policy dilemnras  trccanro morc sevcre after-2-
thc rcjcction of the Ma.rstrit:ht Treat;, in thc l)anislr refercndtrrrr u'l)crt cxc.ltattqe  rtt::'ket
tcrrsiotts  bcgarr to nleunt anrl requiretl  intere.s( ratc iircrurasc:;  in dcfcltcc rlf the ticrl-cr
currctrcics'positiol)  irt tlre band. The roonr for interqst rate increascs  was se3tr b1'rnarkets
to be parlicularly linritcd in those countries  wher,: higher official and nrone'y ntarket ntcs
threatened  to be quickly trallsnliftcd to scrrsitirrc lclrding nrtes, pnrticularly  nrortgalle
ratcs, or to have an imlllediate adverse irupact orr the dcbts of non-bsr)ks as rvell as c,n
govcnrments'  budgetary position;
-  ntatkcts sccnl to havc'bccn  attentive to u,hilt tlrey perc:eived as instrfficieritly  co-ordinrterC
res['0n:;es  of tlre authr.rrities  to thc crisis. Putrlic staterr)er)ts, in general,  dirl linlc to a]t,:r
this rnerkct scrrtirricrrt. Policy actions, in parliculitr reglrrling ceniral rdtes,'wcrc token c,n
a piccenical basis arrd after nrarket pressure, with insuf{lcient attention  dcvoted to the
restoration  of the credibility of the parity grid as a wltole;
-  although thc rrrajor  causes  of the rece.nt exclrange  rate crisis rvere dorrrestic, dcvcloprncnts
outt;idc tlrc Contnturrity also played a role. The very significarrt easing of US monetrry
policy, leading to an unprscedented widening of iutcrest ratc diffcrcntials with Cennany,
rcsr.rtted in strong downward prcssurc on the US dollar vis-A-vis the ERM cunencies,
especially the Deutsohe Mark, with implicatioru for the parity grid. The turmoil in the
Nordic countrics'  cxchangc markets added to the r;linrate of market nervou.sness.
Thc inrpact whicb economic  irnbolances  anrVor policy dilcmnras  could normally  be
expected  to have on cxchangc notc rclotionships  was offset, priior to June 1992, by nrarket cxpcctations
that the proccs$ towards EMU would reduce the likelihood of changes in ccntral parities.  Thcsc
ntarkct expcctations  nlotivated large copital in0ows into highe,r yielding EMS cuncncics sincc the late
| 980s until thc $unrnrer of 1992. Funhermore,  at tist the dorninant impoct of Gcrnran unification orr
its partners  wus felt nrainly through an incrcasc In cxports and a stNngthcning-oftheir cunent-account
positions, masking to a ccrtain extcnt the importancc of the imbalarces a@umulated  sincs the last
realignncnt. Serious sttcnrpts to conect imbalances  were postponed  and thoso domotic  adjustmcnt
ma$urcs that w,erc takcn turncd out to bo lruufllclent. A breolc in marka scntiment occurred after the
outcomc of tho Danl.sh rcfcrcndum and thc Frcrrch rcfcrcndum wos sofn as e rcfercncc darc for on
cxpcctal rcalignmcnt and hcnce a focus for hedging agalrrt ctrnency rlsks or for outright cunoncy
sPeculation.
As the crisis developc4 lt became evldent tbat thc libcralisation and dercgulation of
financial markcts and tholr growing Intcgration - whlch had greatly facilltated tbe llow of privote
cepitol to Conrrnunity countries with finsncing ncc& . tnd also provided scope for capltal movements
of an unprcccdcntcd  slze. Withln these capilal movemenls,  speculative  opontions proved at times to
bc a notablc du;tatrilising force giving rise to serious protlerns also for curencies of countries with
sound economic  fundanrentals,  thcrcby imposing gizesblc costs on thc countritx concented.
Spcculative  opemlions  also imposed a disproportionate  burden on currencies of small countries.Three broarJ conclusiorrs could be drnwn lionr this diagrrosis.
Firstly, witlrottt sufficicnt pro8ress irr convcrgcrrcc  centntl parities canllol be kcltt srablc
in the longer rutr and it r+'ould be prcntature to rnannge  the EM.S as a "de facto', monctary uliol Ls
long as the nece.s.\ary degrec of convcrgcrrce lms not yet been achieved. Exchange  rate adjustrncrrts
rctttaitt a cnrcial feature of the EMS whiclr, horvcvcr,  shortl<l not dcvelop in(o a cnrvling_peg  sysrenl
whiclr would wrrakcn convcfgcrlce.  Insteird, the EMS shoulrl renrain I sy.stenl of fixcd but acljustalrle
cet)tral paritius art( $. opcratcd  rvitltitt thc rules of the Ba.sle-Nyhorg  Agreunenr.  in accorclarrce witlr
tltis Agreenrenl there is a need for early'recognition  of firrrdanrcrrtal disequilibria  nnd u,hen these ar:
identified a realigtttttent should ilc dcciclcd soon and before nrarkets corlre to regard it as ipc'i(a5lc
'l'he difllc:ulties in reachirtg  such judgctttcttts and inrplenrenting thenr befcrre tlre markets reacl tlrcir
own conclusions should not be utldr'res(inrated bul it is vital that they shodtd tre adclrcsscct.  Tlis leads
to tl)c issue of tlte assus-smettt of tlte strslninitbiliry of existing paritics, rvhich is cxirrnined  in
Section II-
Sei:ondly, a successful  nanagcnrcnt of the Systenr depends on an appropriate  policy
nlix. Monelary policy alone cannot berr the burden of ensuring both price stlbiliry and exchange nte
stability in thc ERM. tt necds sdcqunte support from fiscat polioy ond other poticics. This
considcration  is portlcularly import"rnt in the anchor country bcrcausc it cxcrts a dorninant influence  on
the ntonctary conditions in the countries  prrrticiprrting in the ERM- But it also applics to thc othcr
countries because without atlequato support frorn fiscal and other policies they will not be able to
maintain centrul rates.
'  Thirdly, in a situation whcre financial  ma*,ets bave become closety integnted and full
freedom of capital movement has been realiscd, mi$sive spcculatlve pressure miy make the
nmnngenent.of.desirable  rcalignments  more difticult. Morcover, such prcssur€"fnaysrise  even vis-i-
vi3 ctncncics  whosc ccntral poritlcs arc in linc wlth economlc fundamenhls;  this raises tho issue of
pollcy responses  to sutblllsc erchango rates, wblcb ls cxamlne<t  In sectlon lII.
II.  THE ASSF,SSMENT  OFTIIT" SUSTATNASILITY OF CEN'TRAL  PARITIES
Alt ccntral barrks sbare the vlew tbat the osse$ment  of tbc sustainability of cxisting
cclltral paritics should be based on two major componenls: Eocro-economic  pcrformancc  and the
cralibility ofpolicies ln malntrrlnln3  prlcc stabltity.
l.  Macrc-QconomiecdomanCC
There ls broad agreement tbnt thc asscssmcnt  of macro-cconomic pcrformanccs In ERM
counlrics should be based on a set of economlc and financial inditztors. However, thcre is littlc doubt
that the exeroise of assessing  whcther paritics arc in linc with pcrfornrances  cannor bc mcchanistic bur
will have to be to a largc cxtcnt judgmenal.
The assessment would begin . on the extemat side, with particular  attcntion to
international compaitivoness. Ho$cvcr, changcs in reat cxchangc  mtes will not necessarily call
alwoys for a realignment, and unchangcd rcal cxclrarrge ntt6 will not neccssarily  rulo out.thc necd for-4  -
a reillignnleltt. Therefore the assessrncnt  rvill also have to tre based on an analysis of unrlcrlying
lltacro-econotnic tleveloprttents  in each IRM country, l,itlr due regarrl to extcntal  accounts,  pri!ate
saving attd ittvesttttettt, donte.stic grorvllr, buclgctary balarrcc>- rrrrri the sti)nt:e of monetary policy wirlr
resPect to the ot'jeclive  of price stabiliry. ln addition, account should be taken of indicaror.s u,hicllr
dest:ribe the econonric sitrratirtn at the Conrnrurritl,  1g".1.
2.  Cr<lihiliqv of policies
The sustairrgbility  oicenl ral parities does not only rest on miJcro-econonric perfomrcnc:-
but also depends r'lecisively on thc crediLriliry of na(ional policics. The assessrnent of the cretJibilir_v cf
policies thus corr;tilutcs an iudisllerr:,'able elenrenl of thc authorities'surveillance  of cxchange rates.
Thc assessntettt of the credibility of thc F.RM coun(ries'gcouorrric and fina.nciul policies
wltile taking into accotttrt thc past record should focus urainly orr currcnt and future policics. An
intportartt additirrnnl aspect should be thc cxtcnt to rvhich national policics, at the level of cach
cotlntly but also in conrbination and in(emr:tion,  are conducive to milin(nining  thc credibility of the
Systenr as a whole.
Parrj,cular attcrrtion .should be paid to tbe track rccord of individual  governnrcnts arcl
centnl bank5, respectively, in fornrulating realistic ulrgets and. in mccting tbem, the poliricol
conscnsus  on the commitntent  to stability-oriented policies anrl on the exchange  rate objectivc and thc
institutional  statu.s of thc ccntralbank.
The cnrt:ial elentent for the short-run credibitity of a givcn central parity cornes from the
conrmitnlent of nrorrctary policy in is rlcfencc. It is tlrcrcforc impodtnr that therc arc no iinhibirions  to
thc usc of interel rates preventing an cfTective defence of the cuncncy agoinst speculotivl afiack.
T!,g_gllsl.gttge  of comtrdints on nonrirral intcrcst iates seenl.s to bc rclarcd to-g--qunqlgr  of factors; the
sizc of public debt (in particular thc sharc of floatirrg ratc debD ontl dcficirs, thc size of jrivate debr.
thc extent to whicfi GDP deviotes lirom potential, thc lcvcl of uroemployment, thc degrcc of fragility of
the flnnncial seclor, thc speed of transnrision of oflictal and nroney  markct intcrest rates to sensirive
lending ratos and thc instilutlonal  stntus ofthe ccntrul bank.
3.  Sunclllancc  of erchlngs tato rclatioruhips
Thc Committce of Governon  is fully Ewarc tbat thc assessment  of ERM paritics is an
ertrcmely  difTicult task For this reason therc is broad agrccmeot tbat the pdmary pruposc of thc
surveillarcc of crcbangc mte relotlonshlps ls !o firnction as Bn cady waming system and to bring
views closer 8s neganls thc sustalnabllity of central rates or thre desirability of a tlnely reallgnmenr.
The Committcc stands ready to play lts role In this srlrveitlancc cxcrcise  &nd to devlse procedr,rres for
conrnrunicRting  its views to the Ministen.
UI. POLICY RESPONSES'rO  STARILISE EXCIIIANCE RATN.S
Thue might bc situations  in which mauo-oconomic  performanccs  and cuncnt and future
policies would Dot wlnant -a clunge in pariries in the judgement of the authorlties, but wherc
nonetheless market pressurG arisc, Ttris raiscs two issues. Tl[c fust is whethcr and to wlut extent-5-
cotlc€tlcrd actiorr of sttorrg artd wcak currcrl(:y countries  should be emplclyed in the defe'cc of thc
palitics' arrd tltc sccond, hou'to usc, in parlicular,  the various instnrnrents provicled by t5e l9g7
Basle-Nyborg A grcu.rrrcnr.
l.  Corrcc.r_rr)d acrion in rhe defencedtcUln!_trles
The Govcrrloru etrtplrlSise thirt all Conrnrtrnily countries bcncfit sigrrificnrrtly from the
EMS' \\'hilc there is agreement that the defcrrce of a currcrrcy's exchange rdte renl,ins pnnrarily trrc
respottsibility of the cotllltry cortcct'ttcd, it is also recognised  that centnrr banks ha'c a coilective
rcsponsitrility  for tlrc Systcln  arrd 111"1 tlrere is thus a need for closc co.opr.mtio1.
The fonrr of such co-opcration irr a g1111.1.0,r where utwarranteti nrarket prcssures arise
canrrot hc casily defined in ndvnnce. On the one hanrt, the nranagcnrort  of the Systern calls for a ttigh
dcgrss of flexibility with due account to rhe prevailing circurnstarrces and the objec(ive of pronrotirrg
pricc stairility irr the Comnrunity. For rhis riasotr, tlrcrc carrnot be an automatic and mechanistic
response  to ntarket tcnsiott's, involvitrg symmetrirul  action on the pafi of thc authoritics  of countries
with weilk atrd strong currcncies. on the otlrcr tund, thcrc wcre situirtiors  in the recent past where
concerted action in the ficld of intra'marginal  intervention  took ptace ancl provccl hclpful in cou.tcring
nrarket  prcsstrre. The Governors do not rulc out the possitritity  of such action taking ptace on an ad
.hoc ba:is, provided  that it does not jcopardise tlre control ovcr donrcstic nronetary conditions  in rhe
country issuing thc iutcrveution cunency and tlut it is consistent with thc primary otrjcctive of
ochieving  price stability in the Contrnunity. The appropriatcness  of such acrion would have to be
judgcd also in rhc light of tbe prevailing  market situation  and thc acconrpanying meiNures to defend
the cunency in the country concemed.
' "' 2. -'- "'I'he'desinrble mix of the Baslc-Nyborg  Jnsrrurncnrs
Thc rcccnt ERM crlsts bas'confirned  that interventions alonc - whcttrcr  Intnamrrglnal or
at thc margin ' havc a limltr,{ etfcctiveness  in containing  tensions and may cvcn oxaccrbatc thcm, if
market  operatots perceivc that thcy are largc and contlnuc ovcr 0 prolonged period. Letung a currency
dcpr*lote within thc band and reach the towcr timit may atso cncournge specutatlon alrhough in rhe
recsnt past this has on somc occarions  provcd to be an elliclent way of handling marka pressure.
Timely lrcn*'rcs in interest ratc rcmaln thc most pmmlslng coure to counter markct prcssurc,
althougb if intcrcst rates lnve to be kept st veqr high tevcls ovcr a prolonged pcrlod of tlmg they rnay
not bc nrstainnblc In the ilght ofdomestic  cconomic  and tinancial conditioru.
Thc oovcmons  fcel that it woutd not be advisabte to lay dowu prccisc rulcs on how to
employ thc Baslc,D'Iyborg instruments tn a situation of martet pressue. Rather, the rse of the
instrumcnts  should be decided in tine with the objecrive of achicving pricc stability, taking inro
account tbe prr"r'ailitrg  market circumslances  and previous  experienccc  with defending the exc6ange
rate.
There is full agrocnrcnt among thc Govcrnors that nraking market operators  aurare of the
risks of, and possible  losses. from. speculation  is a critical ctement in tlro grcccssful managcmcnt  of
thc Systcrn. To tbis end, In certoin cases it may be adviiable tb allow s currency to strengthen  witbin-6-
tlre banti when ntlrket pressures  case arrd to nrake less prtriic,table rhe conditiorrs a( rvhic:h central
bartks will oB.set tlre liquidity irttpiict of cxt:barrSe  nrarkct irrtcrvt:rrlion  on the nloncy nlarkct.
3.  Tlrc rrsefulncss of putrlic strrtcnreDrs
The (lorrrrrrittcc of Covenron  lras strorrg doubts about tlrc usefulness of collectivc public
statcnletlls in sup;ort of the exisling centrnl paritics if not buckc.d tr;, ir:rntediute actiorr. Lxperierrcc
has shou,n tlrat such statcments rrriry fail to h:r,c a positive inryract on rilarket ilxpectations and could
also be dantrrgirrg  to thc crcdibility  oi tlre aulhoritics. Tlorvever,  wliere corrrbincd rvith decisir,e  and
visiblc flction, dettt0ttstrating  thc auth<rrities'detcnninotion to defelr<l central ratcs, stutentcllts  rnay
play a useful, coniplcnreutiuy  role.
IV.  IN.Sl'ITIJTIONEI,  AND TECIINIC^L  ARRANCEiVII':NTS  GC}VERNING:
CENTRAI., BANK CO-OPIIRATION  IN THE IIRAI\{EWORK  OF THE EI\IS
Therr: is no evidcnce that the institutional and tcclrrrit:irl  features of thc F.MS hhve as such
beert instrunrcntal in bringing about thc rcccnt exclnnge crisis, Currcrrt ilmlngements  reltrain on the
whole nppropria(o.  The Conrmittee,  however,  cxamincd two pilnicular issucs: the first is related to
decisions on the width of the fluctuation bantls, and the secontt, to thc dcnonrination of VSTF
balances.
l.  Elrrctuation bandt
While undcr thc EMS Agreement the establishment  of, and changcs  in, ceilral rdtes are
subject to nrutual agrccment, decisions rcgarding thc fluctuation bands arc left to the re.spcctivc
national authoritir:s.  Thcse rules have bcen in effcct since l9?!). Expcricncc  witlfoirenrting thc tiMS
has shown thot the width of thc fluctuation band must bo rcgardcd 0s 0 mstter of comnron conccrn.
Thc Commlliee  is in full agrccnrcnt  thnt declsions  perruining  to thc size of the band should continue to
be madc In aocordancc witlr the rules in efrect sincc 1979 and should bc preceded by close
consuhallon toking due account ofthe same faclon as thosc cotrsidered whcn thc sustalnablllty  of the
parig 3rid is exannincd.
2.  Denominntion  of VSTF balanCs
ln the contert of the rcccnt large-scale lntervcntiions financed  through thc VSTF, the
ECU-dcnonrlnntion  of VSTF balances had rcsulted ln substarrial exchange  losses for participating
countries. All Govcmors agreod tbat this mattor dcscwed fur1her consideration  and tlrc Commiuee
Inlends to study various posibilitics of changing the present arrangcment,  taklng due account of thc
need to prcscrve nn ECU-based system, thc rcquirenrents of the multilatcralisation within thc EMCF,
thc fairness and predictability of thc rcsults ond simplicity of tlrr: arrangerrrent.-,
\'.  ]\I,\IN CONCI,T'SIONS
Three nrain conclusiot)s  cao be drarvn frorlt this report. Firstly, tlrc exanrirratlorr of the
catrses undcrlyil)g llte recenl crir-is in the ERtvJ suggcsts tlrirr the enlcrgcn(:e of unprecede'tctt
lurbulence rnust bc essen(ially a-scribed to irrsuffit.ient prog,rcss i' ertorronrir: converge.cc,  tlrc effcc:(s
of which \\'ere corrlPotllrdcd by a tlctcriorating cyclicirl situation  ar)d grorving polic;,corfliq:ts.
N'loreover'  slRlctLlrdl charrgc.s in firtlncial nrarkcls have greltly irrcrcescd  the s(:opc for ca.ital
rnovemcnts  and spectrlative opr'ratior)s  provcd a( tinrcs ro be a rrotntrle dcstahllising fort:e. Tirere is full
38'rcctllclit itnlung Goverttors tlr,rt, fo; ccnlrli purities to rcir)irin ci'eclihle. tlrcy nrtrst be suppcirl:cl  try
sotlnd trnderlyirtg ccottornic  conditions anrl crr'<jilllc natitrrrirl policies. Rr.aligrrnrcrrts of cen(r.al  ratcs
rctttaitt att intportarrt  featurc of tlre Syslern irntl provision  rrrust be rna<le for titrrcly fc:.rlignrn(nts  \\,h(.ll
paritics have beconre urrsttstainatrle  in the liglrt of a cotrntry's nlilcro-econonric l.)crrr.!r'rllil'ue  a.rl its
cur'rerll and ftlturc policics' It is therefore of cnrc:ial irnporlant:e  to lsse.ss on a rcgular blsis anrl i. a
candid and frnrrk nlanner thc sustilinability of rhc existing F:RM pnrities.
Secolrtlly, the existing gctrcral rulcs governing  the nlanagcnlenr  of the Systenr renrairr
aPProFrinte.  when a currcncy comes under unwanontcd narket pres.surc,  ttrc country  concenre6
slrould use all instrunrcnts provided by the t98? Baslc-Nyborg  Agrecnrcnt in dcfcnding the cxchangc
rate. Particttlar attention should be givcn to mrrking nrarker opcrators aware of the risks otl and
possible  lot.scs fronr, speculntion. Howevcr, it would nor be dcsirable  to lay tlorvn p1gc15. rulcs on thc
desirahlc rnix of the instruntents which shoutd bc det:ide.d in rhc light of rhe prevailing  nrarkct
circunrstanccs  and individml country expcricnr:cs.
The dcfence of the exchnnge r.tte remains  prinraril,v a national  rcsponsibiliry bur it is
rccognised  that lhe authoritics  havc also a coltective responsibility  for ttte System anrt rhcrc is thus a
necd foillo3,ic<iopiration.  In thc rcccnt pcst, g31 some ocsrsions conccnci'ncrion  *os unctertakcn
and proved  helpful in countcring market pressure. Howevcq thc circuntsrunces in which such 0 cou6e
should bc followed  connot be defincd  in advarcc. Conoerted osiion can thcrcforc rnke plncc only on an
ad hoc basis and provided fte| it docs not conflict with rhe prinrary objoctivc of ochleving pricc
stability in thc parricfpatlng  countries
Thirdly, while ctnent institutiorrat and technicot nmrngements  in ttrc BMS remnin  oo the
wholo appropriatc, tho Comnrittce of Govenrcn  intcncls to study possibtc changcs In the pnsent
arnang0nent  with rxpcct to thc dcnontlnation of VSTF balanccs with a view to a&rpting the sharlng
ofoxchangc  rnte risks among central banks.